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International Rights Affecting the
COVID–19 Vaccine Race
Samantha Johnson †
The impact of the COVID–19 pandemic has been felt worldwide, and despite having several vaccines in the market at
this point, there are still issues of accessibility for certain
countries. International intellectual property law has been a
breeding ground for the exploration of intellectual curiosity
and creation as it provides strong protections to creators.
These strong protections have allowed for the monopolization of certain goods, such as vaccines, under the concept of
patents. While patents are important to incentivize pharmaceutical companies to create life–saving medicines, these
protections have also become a barrier for access to medicines, especially in less–developed countries. This Note
seeks to address the interplay between international intellectual property rights and the right to health under the international human rights framework. Specifically, it will discuss the two differing rights through the United States and
Canada’s efforts to promote creation of COVID–19 vaccine
candidates. In order to highlight the financial driver behind
patent protections, this note will compare the production
and patenting process of the COVID–19 vaccines, a virus
that also heavily impacted developed countries, versus the
under–funded Ebola virus, which predominantly effected
less–developed countries. Finally, this Note will offer recommendations on how countries, and pharmaceutical
†
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companies, can take a human rights approach by utilizing
patent protection exceptions in order to make COVID–19
vaccines accessible to all countries.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
Picking up medication at the pharmacy can oftentimes be accompanied by a real sense of shock upon observing the cost of a
prescription drug. Some small pills can have a list price of hundreds,
if not thousands of dollars, 1 which leads to one lingering question:
what makes these pills so special? There must be some secret formula to create these drugs, or the cost of production must be exorbitant. But the reality is that these formulas are often easily replicable in the form of generics, 2 and even taking production costs into
account, the average markup on a patented drug is close to 400%. 3
If these drugs are simple to manufacture and inexpensive to produce,
why must consumers still pay these high markups? The answer is
simple, and it all boils down to one key word: patents. 4
In the U.S., there have been significant increases in prescription
drug prices over the years, which can partially be attributed to the
strong intellectual property (IP) rights system in America. 5 In the
U.S., the cost of prescription drugs has continued to increase at a
rate higher than the country’s inflation rate. 6 Injectable drugs have
increased by a staggering 15 percent per year, while the inflation
1
Lauren Chase, The 20 Most Expensive Prescription Drugs in the U.S.A.,
GOODRX (Sept. 7, 2021), https://www.goodrx.com/blog/20-most-expensive-drug
s-in-the-usa/.
2
Erin Fox, How Pharma Companies Game the System to Keep Drugs Expensive, HARVARD BUS. REV. (Apr. 6, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/04/howpharma-companies-game-the-system-to-keep-drugs-expensive.
3
Dean Baker, Financing Drug Research: What are the Issues? 7 CTR. FOR
ECON. AND POL’Y RSCH 1, 2 (Sept. 22, 2004), https://cepr.net/documents/publications/intellectual_property_2004_09.pdf.
4
See Abuse of the Patent System is Keeping Drug Prices High for Patients,
ASSN. FOR ACCESSIBLE MEDICINES, https://accessiblemeds.org/campaign/abusepatent-system-keeping-drug-prices-high-patients (last visited Feb. 28, 2021).
5
See Tahir Amin, The Problem with High Drug Prices isn’t ‘Foreign Freeloading,’ it’s the Patent System, CNBC (June 27, 2018, 9:08 AM), https://
www.cnbc.com/2018/06/25/high-drug-prices-caused-by-us-patent-system.html.
6
Yoni Blumberg, Here’s Why Many Prescription Drugs in the US Cost so
Much—and it’s not Innovation or Improvement, CNBC (Jan. 14, 2019, 11:24
AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/10/why-prescription-drugs-in-the-us-costso-much.html.
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rate within the country has only risen roughly 2 percent per year. 7
The Department of Health and Human Services estimates that
“[A]mericans spent more than $460 billion” on prescription drugs
in 2016 alone. 8 On average, a single person in the U.S. is estimated
to pay roughly $1,200 per year on prescription drugs. 9
Similarly, the spending rates on prescription drugs in Canada has
increased at a significant rate. 10 Canada spent $14.5 billion on prescription drugs in 2018. 11 Falling substantially below the U.S., but
still worth recognizing, a Canadian citizen will spend nearly $450
per year on prescription drugs. 12
The remaining costs for prescription drugs are typically a result
of the insurance systems in these two countries. 13 Although Canada
has adopted a universal healthcare system, the system does not fully
cover essential medication. 14 The U.S., on the other hand, has a privatized insurance system which has led to two outcomes. 15 First, a
person who has private insurance will still likely be responsible for

Id.
Ezekiel Emanuel, Big Pharma’s Go-To Defense of Soaring Drug Prices
Doesn’t Add Up, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 23, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/
health/archive/2019/03/drug-prices-high-cost-research-and-development/585253/.
9
Robert Langreth, Drug Prices, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 16, 2020, 1:13 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/drug-prices.
10
Nicole Ireland, Drug Costs Rising Fast in Canadian Health-Care Spending, Report Finds, CBC (Nov. 9, 2017, 2:10 PM), https://www.cbc.ca/news/health
/cihi-health-costs-canada-report-prescriptions-pharmacare-1.4390945.
11
Kelly Grant, Government Spending on Prescription Drugs Grew by 7 Percent Last Year, THE GLOBE & MAIL (Dec. 17, 2019), https://www.theglobe
andmail.com/canada/article-government-spending-on-prescription-drugs-grewby-7-per-cent-last-year/.
12
Pharmacare: The Public Solution to Rising Drug Costs, CANADIAN UNION
OF PUB. EMP. (June 12, 2018), https://cupe.ca/pharmacare-public-solution-risingdrug-costs.
13
Fiona Clement & Katherine A. Memedovich, Drug Coverage in Canada:
Gaps and Opportunities, 43 (3) J PSYCHIATRY NEUROSCI 148, 148 (2018).
14
Ashifa Kassam, The Serious Flaw in Canada’s Healthcare System: Prescription Drugs aren’t Free, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 20, 2017, 6:30 AM), https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/20/canada-national-pharmacare-prescription-drugs.
15
RYAN J. ROSSO, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10830, U.S. HEALTH CARE
COVERAGE AND SPENDING (2021).
7
8
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a portion of the cost of their prescription drugs. 16 These remaining
costs associated with prescription medications can often mean an
individual having to choose between an essential medication and
their basic necessities, which can sometimes lead to death. 17 Second,
there is a large class of people who are left uninsured and thus responsible for the entire cost of any prescription medications they
may need. 18 In 2018, there were 27.5 million uninsured people in
the U.S., which is around 9 percent of the total U.S. population. 19
The expansion of patent rights into the area of pharmaceutical
development is most evidently seen in the area of prescription drug
prices. However, these rights also affect vaccine access and distribution worldwide. 20 While vaccines may be covered by insurance
for some, individuals who lack insurance or lack access to medication in rural areas are often faced with an out–of–pocket cost that
prevents them from accessing a particular vaccine. 21 Without any
form of insurance, some prominent vaccines, like those for mumps,
measles, and rubella, can cost anywhere from $40 to $200, rendering
vaccines prohibitively expensive in less economically affluent areas. 22
Over the last couple decades, prescription drug prices have continued to rise, and vaccine prices have followed suit. 23 In the last
Kassam, supra note 14.
Id.
18
RYAN J. ROSSO, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10830, U.S. HEALTH CARE
COVERAGE AND SPENDING (2021).
19
Katie Keith, Uninsured Rate Rose in 2018 Says Census Bureau Report,
HEALTH AFFAIRS (Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/
hblog20190911.805983/full/.
20
See generally Michaeleen Doucleff, What Will It Take To End The Covid–
19 Pandemic?, NPR (Jan. 5, 2021, 3:52 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/
goatsandsoda/2021/01/05/953653373/some-experts-say-temporary-halt-on-drugpatents-is-needed-to-stop-pandemic-world.
21
Anthony Rivas, Number of Unvaccinated Children Increasing in U.S. Despite Overall High Coverage, ABC NEWS (Oct. 23, 2018, 4:02 PM), https://
abcnews.go.com/Health/number-unvaccinated-children-increasing-us-high-coverage/story?id=58692605.
22
Price List, CVS MINUTE CLINIC, https://www.cvs.com/minuteclinic/services/price-lists (last visited Feb. 28, 2021); see also Elisabeth Rosenthal, The
Price of Prevention: Vaccine Costs are Soaring, NY TIMES (July 2, 2014), https://
www.nytimes.com/2014/07/03/health/Vaccine-Costs-Soaring-Paying-Till-ItHurts.html.
23
Rosenthal, supra note 22.
16
17
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two decades alone, vaccine prices have grown from single digits to
some vaccines costing hundreds of dollars. 24 For example, Prevnar
13, the vaccine used to prevent pneumococcal pneumonia and invasive diseases caused by thirteen streptococcus pneumoniae strains,
has “gone up an average of 6% each year since it was first approved
by the Food and Drug Administration in 2010.” 25 These increases
have put a strain on patients worldwide and have economically diminished the public health budgets for those that are uninsured. 26
With private insurance, the cost to fully vaccinate a child from birth
to the age of 18 is nearly $2,192. 27 This stark cost is mainly attributable to the excessive amounts of pharmaceutical patents which allow for companies to create a monopoly on a specific vaccine for a
certain period of time, and thus the company is able to drive up the
price. 28
Medical patents most adversely impact individuals in developing countries, as more developed countries impose higher protections as they put IP protections above the right to health. 29 In order
to retain profits for pharmaceutical patents, affluent countries will
leverage their trade power to enforce international IP rights in developing countries. 30 This is most clearly seen in the U.S.’s policy
on HIV/AIDS. 31 While the cases of HIV/AIDS in sub–Saharan Africa “account for more than 70 percent of all HIV/AIDS cases globally,” the World Health Organization noted that “50 percent of the
population in developing countries lack access to essential drugs.” 32
This is partially attributable to excessive patenting on new drugs because these patents delay the onset of generic creation which limits
Id.
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
See Generally Overpatented, Overpriced: How Excessive Pharmaceutical
Patenting is Extending Monopolies and Driving up Drug Prices, FED. TRADE
COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2018/0
8/ftc-2018-0055-d-0036-155042.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2022).
29
Chuan-feng Wu, Raising the Right to Health Concerns within the Framework of International Intellectual Property Law, 5 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 141, 159 (2010).
30
Id.
31
Id. at 146.
32
Patent Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, INT’L INTELL. PROP. INST. 1, 4, 9 (2000).
24
25
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immediate accessibility in developing countries. 33 Despite there being three approved antiviral drugs for the treatment of HIV/AIDS,
individuals in developing countries are still dying at a staggering
rate due to their inability to access these necessary medications. 34
This article will further address these shortcomings in the international IP regime and will describe the actions taken by the World
Trade Organization in response.
The United States (U.S.) and Canada both embarked on a mission to create a vaccine in response to the COVID–19 pandemic. 35
When it comes to accessing these vaccines, however, current national and international patent rights in this sector fail to provide adequate protection for one’s right to health. 36 With the rapid spread
of COVID–19 and the attention that was shown during the vaccine
creation period, there is a need to address the interplay between the
created vaccines and ways to make these vaccines available.
This article will examine how the actions of economically powerful countries, like the U.S. and Canada, during the development of
the Covid–19 vaccines has and will continue to impact the ability of
developing countries to access any patented vaccine. Furthermore,
this article will underscore how the U.S. and Canada should take a
human rights–based approach when providing patents to pharmaceutical companies who are creating COVID–19 vaccines. Part II of
this note will begin with a brief background on the relevant international IP protections and right to health provisions that will be referenced throughout. Part III will then examine the patent process
See Generally Intellectual Property and Access to Medicine, OXFAM,
https://www.oxfamamerica.org/explore/issues/economic-well-being/intellectualproperty-and-access-to-medicine/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2022).
34
Id. at 9.
35
See generally Jaimy Lee, These 23 Companies are Working on Coronavirus Treatments or Vaccines – Here’s Where Things Stand, MARKETWATCH
(May 6, 2020, 2:50 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/these-nine-compa
nies-are-working-on-coronavirus-treatments-or-vaccines-heres-where-thingsstand-2020-03-06; see also Emily Chung, A Closer Look at the Vaccines Canada
is Betting on to Stem the Spread of COVID–19, CBC (Sept. 2, 2020, 4:00 AM),
https://www.cbc.ca/news/health/covid-vaccines-canada-profiles-1.5708240.
36
“Whoever Finds the Vaccine Must Share it” Strengthening Human Rights
and Transparency around Covid–19 Vaccines, HUM. RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. 29,
2020), https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/10/29/whoever-finds-vaccine-must-shar
e-it/strengthening-human-rights-and-transparency [hereinafter Strengthening Human Rights and Transparency around Covid–19].
33
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during the Ebola outbreak and parallel that process with the current
state of affairs surrounding the coronavirus vaccine development.
Part IV will address the actions that were taken to promote COVID–
19 vaccine development in the U.S. and Canada. Part V will analyze
the impact that international IP laws and the international right to
health have on the COVID–19 patent process. This section will
highlight the relevant exclusions and provisions asserted within the
Agreement on Trade–Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS Agreement) that pertain to a national health emergency. Moreover, this section will also examine the interrelated nature of IP rights within the international human rights framework.
Finally, this note will briefly conclude with a recommendation for
economically developed countries, in their development of COVID–
19 vaccines, to allow the usage of the provisions within the TRIPS
Agreement that pertain to patenting during a pandemic in order to
remain in accordance with their duties under the relevant international human rights laws. These recommendations will expound
upon the differing limitations that countries are permitted to impose
upon patent rights during a national health crisis and will highlight
which options may be best suited for ensuring that any COVID–19
vaccine is made available globally.
II.
RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Patents give pharmaceutical corporations exclusive rights to a
drug that they create, which in turn incentivizes them to continue
engaging in research and development (R&D). 37 The need for patents in the pharmaceutical sector has typically been justified by the
need to ensure that drug manufacturers are able to recoup the substantial investments necessary for R&D and the costs of regulatory
testing. 38 These funds are important, given that the estimated cost of
developing a new drug is $500 million. 39 The creation of novel vaccines, like other inventions, provide the inventor with certain rights
KEVIN RICHARDS ET AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46221, DRUG PRICING AND
PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTING PRACTICES (2020).
38
Id.
39
Omudhome Ogbru, Why Drugs Cost so Much, MEDICINE NET,
https://www.medicinenet.com/drugs_why_drugs_cost_so_much/views.htm (last
visited Oct. 7, 2020).
37
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to exclusivity which allow the inventor to generate the highest profits off of their creation for a certain amount of time.
A.

Vaccine Patents
Vaccines are often protected by several levels of IP rights
through the granting of patents to the original vaccine creators. 40
While older vaccines, like the vaccine for mumps or polio, have no
remaining IP barriers due to these vaccines formulations being created over 20 years ago, the vaccines that have not reached the 20–
year mark still retain the same protections as the prescription drugs
discussed above. 41 Typically, to get around these patents, pharmaceutical companies will make slight changes to the patented vaccine
so they can manufacture and distribute their own version without
violating the initial patent holder’s right. 42 For example, a pharmaceutical company could improve the patented formulation, change
the dosage, or alter the delivery procedure. 43 Furthermore, patent
holders can likewise implement small changes in their patented formula to increase their exclusivity in the market. 44 This process, also
known as “evergreening,” is the practice of “applying for multiple,
successive patents on minor or insignificant variants or indications
of already–patented compounds to extend the period of market exclusivity.” 45
While making changes to a patented vaccine is a loophole to creating a similar vaccine without violating a patent holder’s rights to
their creation, the costs and experience needed to embark on this
challenge can often keep less economically stable companies or
government entities from engaging in this practice. 46 Changing the

40
Martin Friede, Intellectual Property and License Management with Respect to Vaccines, WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/phi/news/Present
ation15.pdf?ua=1 (last visited Mar. 18, 2022).
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
How is Access to Medicines a Human Rights Issue?, HEALTH & HUM.
RIGHTS RES. GUIDE, https://www.hhrguide.org/2017/06/09/access-to-medicinesand-human-rights/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2021).
45
Id.
46
Friede, supra note 40.
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formulation of a patented vaccine takes both time and money. 47
Companies attempting to do so must also have the expertise to examine the formulation of the patented vaccine and make any appropriate alterations that do not affect the overall efficacy of the vaccine. 48 Corporations are also responsible for financing their own research and costs associated with putting their new formulation
through clinical trials, should they fail to gain private or governmental support. 49 The accumulation of these factors often leaves only
large pharmaceutical companies exploring this loophole, and thus
dominating the market by using the patent protection period to “produce the medicine and charge whatever price the market will bear,
without fear of competition.” 50
While R&D of vaccines is crucial to minimizing the impact and
scale of major outbreaks, current international IP protections can often hinder these beneficial effects. 51 Specifically, the current IP regime fails to consider developing populations when producing and
protecting patents for critical vaccines. 52 The current regime creates
two main impediments to “securing widespread affordability and accessibility:” 53 the first is vaccine nationalism and the second is the
incentivization of “price–gouging and artificial scarcity.” 54 The vaccine nationalist approach pits the more affluent countries against
each other as they compete to gain first access to new vaccines. 55
47
Stanley Plotkin et al., The Complexity and Cost of Vaccine Manufacturing
– An Overview, 35 VACCINE 4064, 4065 (2017).
48
Friede, supra note 40.
49
Institute of Medicine (US) Forum on Drug Discovery, Development, and
Translation, Breakthrough Business Models: Drug Development for Rare and Neglected Diseases and Individualized Therapies: Workshop Therapy, NAT’L
ACADEMIES PRESS 2 (2009), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK50972/.
50
Fran Quigley, Making Medicines Accessible: Alternatives to the Flawed
Patent System, HEALTH & HUM. RIGHTS J. (Nov. 23, 2015), https://www.hhrjour
nal.org/2015/11/making-medicines-accessible-alternatives-to-the-flawed-patentsystem-2/.
51
Ana Santos Rutschman, IP Preparedness for Outbreak Diseases, 65
UCLA L. REV. 1200,1204-1206 (2018) [hereinafter IP Preparedness].
52
Wu, supra note 29, at 146.
53
Why the World Needs a People’s Vaccine, OPEN SOC’Y FOUND.,
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/explainers/why-the-world-needs-a-peoples-vaccine (last updated May 2021).
54
Id.
55
Id.
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These competing interests lead to a mindset that hinders “universal
access to a vaccine.” 56 This interrelationship between the need for
vaccines and the detriments of stringent IP protections can be analyzed by looking at two often competing rights: (1) the right to IP
protections, and (2) the right to health.
B.

IP Rights: Patents
IP rights include a broad category of rights that cover a number
of creative innovations and give their creators legal protections
against those attempting to copy or replicate their creations. 57 According to the World Trade Organization, IP is defined as “creations
of the mind.” 58 These creations can “take many forms, such as artistic expressions, signs, symbols . . . designs and inventions.” 59
Patents offer creators a competitive advantage in the market by
giving them rights to protect their creation against use by others. 60
Rights associated with patents give the inventor a legal right to exclude other individuals from making, using, or selling the inventor’s
creation for a set number of years. 61 During these years of exclusivity, inventors in the pharmaceutical sector are guaranteed a profit
because they hold the exclusive rights to a formulation of a drug that
is needed in the market. 62 This level of exclusivity can often lead to
the creation of a monopoly, permitting pharmaceutical patent holders to highly inflate the cost of the drug within the market because
they are faced with no competition until another pharmaceutical
company can create a new formulation of the drug that retains

Id.
See Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement, WORLD TRADE
ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm (last
visited Jan. 19, 2021).
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
See generally Kevin Rivette et al., Discovering New Value in Intellectual
Property, HARVARD BUS. REV. (Jan.– Feb. 2000), https://hbr.org/2000/01/discov
ering-new-value-in-intellectual-property.
61
General information concerning patents, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE
(July 1, 2021), https://www.uspto.gov/patents/basics/general-information-pat
ents.
62
Emanuel, supra note 8.
56
57
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efficacy. 63 IP rights are expounded upon in the both the international
human rights system and within international trade agreements.
i. IP Under International Human Rights Law
Article 15 of International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) broadly describes a right to participate in
cultural life, and in this broad language there is a right to protect
one’s own creations. 64 As written, Article 15(1)(c) states that there
is a “right of everyone . . . to benefit from the protection of the moral
and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic
production of which he is the author.” 65 This section from Article
15 identifies that a person’s right to retain some level of protection
over their creation is inherently necessary for one to engage fully in
cultural life. 66 However, the approach to this right within Article 15
is from a human–centered perspective, as it was included to uphold
the dignity of the person. 67
Furthermore, General Comment 17 notes that IP rights are different from human rights, as IP rights are “generally of a temporary
nature.” 68 Explained within the general comment is the notion that
IP rights can be “revoked, licensed or assigned to someone else.” 69
The comment goes on to explain that “intellectual property
rights, . . . may be allocated, limited in time and scope, traded,
amended and even forfeited.” 70 This distinction is made between the
traditional idea of IP rights and human rights because the IP rights
described in Article 15 of the covenant do “not necessarily coincide
with what is referred to as intellectual property rights under national
Id.
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights art. 15,
adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
65
Id.
66
Hum. Rts. Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/20/26 (May 14, 2012).
67
Id. at ¶ 2.
68
Comm. On Econ. Soc. And Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 17: The
Right of Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of which he or
she is the Author., ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. CESCR/C.12/GC/17 (Jan. 12, 2006) [hereinafter
CESCR General Comment No. 17].
69
Id.
70
Id.
63
64
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legislation or international agreements.” 71 Apart from the human
rights system, IP rights are also heavily discussed in international
trade agreements.
ii. TRIPS Agreement
The TRIPS Agreement is critical to facilitate “trade in
knowledge and creativity” and to resolve “trade disputes over intellectual property.” 72 This agreement was created by the World Trade
Organization on January 1, 1995 to ensure that WTO members had
guidance and latitude to promote trade. 73 Thus, TRIPS is the “legal
recognition of the significance of links between IP and trade.” 74 Before this agreement there existed large gaps between the extent of IP
protections and enforcement in the varying countries. 75 Recognition
of this discrepancy led to the creation of the WTO’s TRIPS Agreement that sought to narrow the discrepancies in how IP “rights are
protected and enforced around the world, and to bring them under
common international rules.” 76
The TRIPS Agreement is the minimum standard of IP protections implemented internationally, however the U.S. and other sovereigns are left with the autonomy to implement higher standards of
protection. 77 As stated in Article 1(1), “members may, but shall not
be obliged to, implement in their law more extensive protection than
is required” by the TRIPS Agreement, “provided that such protection does not contravene the provisions of this agreement.” 78 Therefore, member states are given flexibility to enact more stringent

Id.
Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement, supra note 57.
73
Overview: The TRIPS Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.
org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2021).
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Apr. 15, 1984, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, art. 1(1), 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPS Agreement].
71
72
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protections, as long as the protections do not diminish any of the
protections set forth in the TRIPS Agreement. 79
There are numerous sections in the TRIPS Agreement addressing the varying areas of IP, but the most relevant section for vaccine
discussions is the article on patents. 80 Broadly described in Article
27(1), the WTO explains patentable subject matter, stating that “patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology and
whether the products are imported or locally produced.” 81 The protections guaranteed under a granted patent are outlined in Article 28
with patent holders being granted a set of exclusive rights to protect
their patented creation. 82 These rights include “prevent[ing] third
parties not having the owner’s consent from the acts of: making, using, offering for sale, selling, or important for these purposes that
produce,” and granting patent owners the “right to assign, or transfer
by succession, the patent and to conclude licensing contracts.” 83
iii. The Doha Declaration
With the lack of clarity provided on what constitutes an epidemic or national emergency in the TRIPS Agreement exclusions
sovereigns are left with unfettered discretion on whether or not an
exclusion applies. In order to provide more clarity, the DOHA Declaration was written in an attempt to clarify the vaguely described
need for governments to apply the principles of public health and
the articles of the TRIPS Agreement. 84 Adopted on November 14,
2001, the Declaration attempted to address the issue of patent protections restricting “access to affordable medicines for populations
in developing countries.” 85 While IP protection does serve an
See generally Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement, supra
note 57.
80
Ana Santos Rutschman, The Intellectual Property of Vaccines: Takeaways
from Recent Infectious Disease Outbreaks, 118 MICH. L. REV. 170, 172 (2020)
[hereinafter IP of Vaccines].
81
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 78, at art. 27(1).
82
Id. at art. 28.
83
Id. at art. 28(1).
84
The DOHA Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/doha_declar
ation/en/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2021) [hereinafter DOHA Declaration Explained].
85
Id.
79
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important role in furthering medical R&D, the Declaration is predominantly concerned with the effects that strict IP protections can
have on drug? prices. 86
The Declaration sought to resolve the issues that arise with IP
protections in times of public health concerns. 87 In the first paragraph, the declaration “recognize[s] the gravity of the public health
problems afflicting both developed and least–developed countries,
especially problems resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics.” 88 The Declaration then goes on to reiterate that the TRIPS Agreement should not be read to inhibit member
states from “taking measures to protect public health.” 89 Actually,
the agreement encourages member states to use to the fullest extent
“the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which provide flexibility”
for this exact purpose. 90 The Declaration provides member states
with the authority to grant compulsory licenses and “determine the
grounds upon which such licenses are granted.” 91 However, similar
to the TRIPS Agreement, the Declaration leaves member states with
the authority to determine what constitutes a national emergency. 92
The failure to clearly identify the situations that call for exceptions
leaves sovereigns with a substantial amount of leeway that can often
hinder less economically developed countries from accessing affordable vaccines even during a health crisis. 93 Access is limited because compulsory licenses are only granted if a State declares a national emergency, and since less economically developed countries
are often more reliant on generic importations governments are often hesitant to invoke compulsory licenses under the national emergency exception because of the potential backlash from their trade
Id.
Victoria Hopkins, Analysis of International Patent Protection and Global
Public Health, 17 J. OF PUB. & INT’L AFF. 83, 86 (2006).
88
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, ¶ 1, WT/MIN(01)
/DEC/2 (Nov. 20, 2001) [hereinafter DOHA Declaration].
89
Id. at ¶ 4.
90
Id.
91
Id. at ¶ 5(b).
92
Id. at ¶ 5(c).
93
Vanessa Bradford Kerry & Kelley Lee, TRIPS, the DOHA declaration and
paragraph 6 decision: what are the remaining steps for protecting access to medicines?, GLOBALIZATION & HEALTH 3 (2007), https://globalizationandhealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1744-8603-3-3.
86
87
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partners in other trade areas. 94 Finally, the Declaration encourages
members from developed countries to “provide incentives to their
enterprises and institutions to promote and encourage technology
transfer to least–developed country members.” 95 Although IP rights
have substantial protections both nationally and internationally, the
right to health is a non–traditional right predominantly found only
in international agreements.
C.

International Right to Health
An individual’s right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health can be found in several international legal
agreements. 96 First, the right to health on the international scale is
described in ICESCR and affirmed by CESCR’s General Comment
14, the treaty body responsible for monitoring implementation of
ICESCR, as the right of everyone to the “enjoyment of the highest
attainable standard of physical and mental health.” 97 This idea of a
multifaceted right to health is further defined by the World Health
Organization (WHO), which defines health as “a state of complete
physical, mental, and social well–being and not merely the absence
of disease or infirmity.” 98 Inherent in this definition is the fact that
the right to health is not a guarantee that everyone will be at the
optimum health level or even healthy, as it is impossible for a state
actor to prevent every illness or condition. 99 The right to health is
more so a guarantee that state actors will take the necessary actions,
or forego taking actions, so that individuals have the ability to obtain
their personal highest standard of health. 100 The right to health guarantees access to healthcare that is available, accessible, acceptable,

Id.
DOHA Declaration, supra note 88, at ¶ 7.
96
See generally G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, at art. 25(1) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]; see also ICESCR, supra
note 64, at art. 12.
97
ICESCR, supra note 64, at art. 12.
98
World Health Org., Constitution of the World Health Organization, pmbl
https://www.who.int/governance/eb/who_constitution_en.pdf.
99
Comm. on Econ. Soc., and Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 14: The
Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. CESCR/C.12
/2000/4 (Nov. 8, 2000) [hereinafter CESCR General Comment No. 14].
100
Id. at ¶ 30–33.
94
95
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and of quality. 101 With that in mind, there are several international
agreements and declarations that discuss the right to health and the
obligations this right places upon state actors. 102
Although the most authoritative source on the right to health is
ICESCR, the right to health is also referenced in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Convention on
the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), the
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW), and the Convention on the Rights of
the Child (CRC). 103 The UDHR is not a legally binding document,
so the rights set forth in the document are adopted by states on a
voluntary basis. 104 However, it should be noted that the UDHR is a
heavily influential document, as it has had a “profound influence on
the development of international human rights law.” 105 ICERD,
CEDAW, and CRC, however, have differing binding authority on
the U.S. and Canada. 106 Therefore, it is necessary to recognize that
the U.S.’s obligations under treaties referencing the right to health
are distinct from Canada’s obligations. 107
A country that has signed a treaty, as opposed to having ratified
a treaty, imposes differing obligations on the country. 108 A signatory
Id. at ¶ 30.
Id. at ¶ 2, 33.
103
International Covenant on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination art. 5(e)(iv), ratified Oct. 21, 1994, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 212 [hereinafter
ICERD]; Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against
Women art. 11.1(f), adopted Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter
CEDAW]; Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 24, adopted Nov. 20, 1989,
1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRC].
104
What is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?, AUSTRALIAN HUM.
RIGHTS COMM’N, https://humanrights.gov.au/our-work/what-universal-declarati
on-human-rights (last visited Mar. 1, 2021).
105
Id.
106
See generally United States Ratification of International Human Rights
Treaties, HUM. RIGHTS WATCH (July 24, 2009, 12:24 PM), https://www.hrw.org
/news/2009/07/24/united-states-ratification-international-human-rights-treaties.
107
Id.
108
Chapter Four: Becoming a Party to the Convention and the Optional Protocol, U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFF., https://www.un.org/development/desa
/disabilities/resources/handbook-for-parliamentarians-on-the-convention-on-therights-of-persons-with-disabilities/chapter-four-becoming-a-party-to-the-convention-and-the-optional-protocol.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2021) [hereinafter
Chapter Four].
101
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cannot take any actions that would violate the core purpose of the
treaty. 109 In the context of the right to health, this could be intentionally denying information about contraception or HIV/AIDS methods of prevention. 110 On the other hand, a state that has ratified a
treaty outlining a right to health has three obligations: (1) to respect,
(2) to protect, and (3) to fulfill each person’s right to the highest
attainable standard health. 111 The obligation to respect entails “refrain[ing] from interfering directly or indirectly with the enjoyment
of the right to health.” 112 The obligation to protect requires state actors to take any necessary measures to “prevent third parties from
interfering with individual’s right to health.” 113 Finally, the obligation to fulfill requires that state actors “adopt appropriate legislative,
administrative, budgetary, judicial, promotional and other measures
towards the full realization of the right to health.” 114
While the U.S. has only ratified ICERD, they have signed
ICESCR. 115 Canada has ratified both ICESCR and ICERD, assuming significantly more obligations than the U.S. 116 Despite only
signing ICESCR, the U.S. is still under an obligation to “refrain in
good faith from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the
treaty.” 117 However, this limitation does not appear to be substantial,
as the right to health is only one part of the treaty.
Canada, by ratifying ICESCR, has agreed to be bound by the
treaty and thus must respect, protect, and fulfill the right to health. 118
Id.
CESCR General Comment No. 14, supra note 99, ¶ 33.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard, UNITED NATIONS OFF. OF
THE HIGH COMM’R, https://indicators.ohchr.org (last visited Mar. 1, 2021) [hereinafter Status of Ratification].
116
Curtis Bradley, Treaty Signature, DUKE LAW SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY
(Oct. 5, 2011), https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=308
8&context=faculty_scholarship; see also Status of Ratification, supra note 115.
117
2011 Treaty Event Towards Universal Participation and Implementation:
Fact Sheet #1, UNITED NATIONS, https://treaties.un.org/doc/source/events/2011
/Press_kit/fact_sheet_1_english.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2021).
118
International Human Rights Law, UNITED NATIONS OFF. OF THE HIGH
COMM’R, https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/internationallaw.
aspx (last visited Mar. 1, 2021).
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Respect requires that a “State refrain from interfering directly or indirectly with the enjoyment of the right to health.” 119 Protection entails that a state “take measures that prevent third parties from interfering” with the right to health guaranteed in Article 12. 120 Finally,
states must fulfill the right to health by adopting “appropriate legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial, promotional and other
measures towards the full realization of the right to health.” 121 General Comment 14 also highlights the “essential role” of international
cooperation and that sovereigns “comply with their commitment to
take joint and separate action to achieve the full realization of the
right to health.” 122
i. ICESCR: Article 12
As evidenced by General Comment 14 by CESCR, the right to
health comes with caveats. 123 First, the right to health is not a guarantee that a person will be healthy, as this is an impossibility. 124 The
right to health more predominantly focuses on the actions and lack
of actions that are required of the State parties. 125 State parties are
limited in the actions they can take that would infringe on individuals’ right to health, given their duty to ensure the realization of the
right to health through state actions. 126
The right to health as it pertains to access to medications was
explained by Special Rapporteur Anand Grover in her report to the
United Nations General Assembly. 127 The Special Rapporteur was
careful to note that “access to medicines is an integral component of
the right to health.” 128 Based on this, she explained that all medications should be made “available, accessible, acceptable and of good
CESCR General Comment No. 14, supra note 99, at ¶ 33
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id. at ¶ 38.
123
Id.
124
Id. at ¶ 8.
125
CESCR General Comment No. 14, supra note 99, at ¶ 38.
126
Id.
127
Hum. Rts. Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental
Health, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/42 (May 1, 2013) [hereinafter Special Rapporteur
on Highest Attainable Standard of Health].
128
Id. at ¶ 3.
119
120
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quality.” 129 Availability refers to the principle that medications must
be “available in sufficient quantity within the state party.” 130 Accessibility, both physical and economic accessibility, means that the
medicine must be available to every individual without discrimination. 131 Physical accessibility means that the medicine must be
“within safe physical reach for all sections of the population.” 132
Economic accessibility requires that the medicines are affordable for
all individuals. 133 Acceptability requires that medicine “must be respectful of medical ethics and culturally appropriate.” 134 Finally,
good quality requires that the medications are “scientifically and
medically appropriate.” 135
ii. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
Article 25 of the UDHR contains a detailed list of rights that
pertain to an individual’s right to health. Article 25(1) states that
“[e]veryone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the
health and well–being of himself and of his family, including food,
clothing, housing and medical care and the necessary social services.” 136 Furthermore, this right goes on to provide that everyone
also has “the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in
circumstances beyond his control.” 137 Despite not being legally
binding on any countries, the “protections of the rights and freedoms
set out in the Declaration has been incorporated into many national
constitutions and domestic legal frameworks.” 138

Id. at ¶ 4.
Id.
131
CESCR General Comment No. 14, supra note 99, at ¶ 12 (b).
132
Id.
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Id.
134
Id.
135
Id.
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UDHR, supra note 96, at art. 25(1).
137
Id.
138
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, AMNESTY INT’L, https://www.
amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/universal-declaration-of-human-rights/ (last visited
Mar. 1, 2021).
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iii. ICERD
Article 5 of ICERD provides that without distinction “as to race,
colour, or national origin,” everyone has a right to “public health,
medical care, social security and social services.” 139 As both Canada
and the U.S. have ratified ICERD, they are both bound by this treaty,
and thus have a duty to uphold the right to public health. 140
While both ICESCR and ICERD seem to put varying degrees of
obligations on the U.S., the attention afforded documents in the U.S.
is minimal and mainly aspirational. 141 While the U.S. has signed
ICESCR and ratified ICERD, the process through which the U.S.
ratifies treaties “diminishes the treaties’ intended effects.” 142 When
engaging in the ratification process, the U.S. will engage in reservations, declarations, or understandings to combat any provisions in
the treaty that are more stringent than existing U.S. law. 143 Furthermore the U.S. renders treaties “not self–executing,” and therefore
they are only enforceable in courts through the implementation of
legislation. 144 Moreover, the U.S. does not seek to enact legislation
promoting the right to health as they argue that the right to health is
already protected by the laws in the U.S., however, the U.S. has not
expounded on how the right is protected by the current legal regime. 145
III.
EBOLA CRISIS
This history leading up to the creation of a vaccine for the Ebola
virus starkly contrasts the efforts in creating the COVID–19 vaccines, as Ebola is a predominantly underfunded disease. 146 This lack
of funding stemmed from the fact that the Ebola virus mainly impacted lower–economic countries and rural communities. 147
ICERD, supra note 103, at art. 5(e)(iv).
Chapter Four, supra note 108.
141
U.S. Aversion to International Human Rights Treaties, GLOB. JUST.
CENTER BLOG (June 22, 2017), https://globaljusticecenter.net/blog/773-u-s-avers
ion-to-international-human-rights-treaties.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
IP Preparedness, supra note 51, at 1218.
147
Id. at 1219.
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Attention and funding towards the vaccine did not arise until economically advanced countries were impacted by the effects of the
Ebola virus. 148 Thus, analyzing the timeline of the Ebola vaccine
development as compared to the COVID–19 vaccine development
will help to highlight the dangers that stem from the use? enforcement? of strict IP rights during a global health crisis. It will also help
illustrate the impact that first world country patent rights can have
on those living in less economically stable countries when it comes
to widespread viruses.
A.

Timeline
Unfortunately, it took roughly 30 years to garner enough national attention to start R&D for a potential vaccine. 149 In 1976, the
first strain of the virus appeared in Sudan. 150 This initial strain of the
virus manifested itself mainly in animals, so response to this initial
outbreak was minimal. 151 The next prominent exposure was the
third strain of the Ebola virus, which appeared in humans in 1994. 152
At that point, this new strain of the virus began to affect Uganda. 153
A common denominator afflicting all of the areas where outbreaks
occurred is the minimal regional economic power that fails to draw
interest from private companies. 154 Despite the high outbreak fatality rate between 1996 and 2016 ranging from a low of 25 percent to
as high as 90 percent, the lack of funding interest remained. 155
Despite the reluctance of big pharmaceutical corporations to engage in costly R&D, the Canadian government funded research to
create a vaccine for the Ebola virus. 156 After several years of research, a patent for an Ebola virus vaccine, rVSV–ZEBOV, was
Id. at 1224.
See Outbreaks Chronology: Ebola Virus Disease, CDC, http://www.cdc.g
ov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/history/chronology.html (last updated July 28, 2017).
150
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IP Preparedness, supra note 51, at 1208.
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Id.
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Id. at 1209.
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Id. at 1218–19.
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William W. Fisher III & Katrina Geddes, Learning from Ebola: How
Drug–Development Policy Could Help Stop Outbreaks of Infectious Diseases,
STANFORD UNIV. PRESS 1, 9 (Oct. 14, 2015), https://cyber.harvard.edu/people/tfi
sher/Learning_from_Ebola.pdf.
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granted to Canada in 2003. 157 Animal testing was performed on the
patented vaccine and these tests confirmed that the vaccine was safe
and highly efficient. 158 Moved by these promising results, researchers initially hoped to begin human trials and subsequently licensing
the vaccine by 2010. 159 However, this timeline was not met, as private pharmaceutical companies remained reluctant to engage in the
costly development process until the 2014–2016 outbreak. 160 The
later outbreak, which reached the U.S., opened up funding that
would aid in supporting expedited R&D for the virus. 161 After the
opening of funding, the rVSV–ZEBOV vaccine was eventually licensed to Merck and received FDA approval for prevention of the
Ebola virus in 2019. 162
B.

Connections to the COVID–19 Development
A key theme presented throughout the Ebola vaccine development history was that private pharmaceutical companies were unwilling to engage in the costly R&D associated with vaccine development for a virus that predominantly affected a group of people
unable to generate enough revenue to cover the costs of R&D. 163
This notion is central in vaccination processes, as companies engaging in costly R&D have a greater motivation to focus their resources
on treatments or preventatives for diseases that will generate large
profits, like HIV/AIDS medications. 164 The intermittent nature of
the Ebola outbreaks and the fact that these outbreaks occurred in
non–affluent areas kept R&D efforts at a minimal level. 165
IP Preparedness, supra note 51, at 1221; see also Recombinant Vesicular
Stomatitis Virus Vaccines for Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers, Can. Patent No. WO
2004/011–488 A2 (filed July 28, 2003).
158
IP Preparedness, supra note 51, at 1221.
159
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160
Id. at 1222.
161
Id. at 1219.
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First FDA–approved vaccine for the prevention of Ebola virus disease,
marking a critical milestone in public health preparedness and response, U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/pressannouncements/first-fda-approved-vaccine-prevention-ebola-virus-diseasemarking-critical-milestone-public-health.
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Furthermore, the fact that vaccine development oftentimes entails a reliance on public health organizations, governments, or nonprofits renders it challenging to address the spread of viruses. 166
These organizations or entities are often limited in funding, support,
and have a lack of experience in developing vaccines at a rapid
rate. 167 As seen with the Canadian government during the production of the Ebola vaccine, it took almost a decade to move from patent to human trials. 168 Contrast that process with the less than a year
it has taken to place several vaccines on the market for the COVID–
19 virus. 169 The main difference between the two historical timelines is that COVID–19 vaccine development was supported by big
pharmaceutical companies that have the necessary resources to expedite R&D. 170
The troubles plaguing the vaccine development for the Ebola virus highlight the potential repercussions that may stem from
COVID–19 vaccine patents. While players in big pharmaceuticals
were quick to produce these COVID–19 vaccines, these large corporations have failed to address how their granted patents will affect
the access to a vaccine in communities that reside in less affluent or
rural areas. 171 The main focus on profit fails to consider the widespread impact of this virus, especially as it pertains to the communities that these pharmaceutical companies neglected during the
Ebola outbreaks. 172 As seen by the development of the Ebola virus
vaccine, private pharmaceutical corporations’ main priority is
profit. 173 Thus, there must be a system of checks and balances to
Id. at 1244.
Id. at 1204.
168
Id. at 1221.
169
Nikola Davis, How has a Covid Vaccine been Developed so Quickly?, THE
GUARDIAN (Dec. 8, 2020, 06:58 EST), https://www.theguardian.com/society
/2020/dec/08/how-has-a-covid-vaccine-been-developed-so-quickly.
170
Drew Armstrong, The World’s Most Loathed Industry gave us a Vaccine
in Record Time, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 23, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg
.com/news/features/2020-12-23/covid-vaccine-how-big-pharma-saved-theworld-in-2020.
171
Sharon Lerner, World Faces Covid–19 “Vaccine Apartheid”, THE
INTERCEPT (Dec. 31, 2020, 9:52 AM), https://theintercept.com/2020/12/31/covid
-vaccine-countries-scarcity-access/.
172
IP of Vaccines, supra note 80, at 170–71.
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Richard Anderson, Pharmaceutical Industry gets High on Fat Profits,
BBC NEWS (Nov. 6, 2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-28212223.
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ensure that people worldwide have economic and physical access to
the vaccines, and this requires a restructuring of the strong IP rights
associated with pharmaceutical patents.
IV.

CURRENT RESPONSES TO COVID–19 VACCINE
DEVELOPMENT

A.

The Vaccine Race
As exemplified by the Ebola outbreak in 2014–2016, large scale
outbreaks temporarily heighten the incentives for private pharmaceutical compani3es to engage in costly R&D. 174 These incentives,
such as increased funding streams, ignite a race for the development
of a vaccine that responds to the outbreak. 175 Moreover, pharmaceutical companies are not often forced to start from scratch on a vaccine. 176 It is likely that any pathogen that has had a modicum of pre–
outbreak R&D will be already have technology that is protected by
IP rights. 177 However, similar to changing formulations, big pharmaceutical companies can utilize this prior research to develop their
own vaccine or drug that they themselves can patent. 178
While the race for patents primarily wages between private pharmaceutical companies due to their economic power, some governments will often involve themselves in the development process to
promote a sense of vaccine nationalism. 179 Countries seeking to be
the leader in the vaccine race will open up funding, expedite patent
processes, and aid private companies that are within their region. 180
Currently three major players have hit the U.S. market with a
COVID–19 vaccine: (1) Moderna, (2) Pfizer–BioNTech, and (3)

IP Preparedness, supra note 51, at 1222.
Id. at 1225–26.
176
Id. at 1244.
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Jon Smith et al., Vaccine Production, Distribution, Access and Uptake,
NAT’L CENTER FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY INFO. (July 30, 2011), https://www.ncbi.
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Johnson and Johnson. 181 On December 11, 2020 the first vaccine
was approved by the FDA for emergency usage and formulated by
Pfizer and BioNTech. 182 The Pfizer vaccine is “based on mRNA
technology, which is completely new in a human vaccine.” 183 The
vaccine was formulated by introducing “part of the genetic material
of the SARS–CoV–2 virus in the form of messenger RNA.” 184
Moderna’s vaccine uses the same mRNA type of formulation in
their COVID–19 vaccine. 185
Ingredients within the two vaccines are similar, however there
are some slight differences in formulation and dosages. 186 Pfizer’s
ingredients are listed as: mRNA, lipids, potassium chloride, monobasic potassium phosphate, sodium chloride, dibasic sodium phosphate dehydrate, and sucrose. 187 Moderna’s ingredients are mRNA,
lipids, tromethamine, tromethamine hydrochloride, acetic acid, sodium acetate, and sucrose. 188 Furthermore, while both vaccines require two shots, Moderna chose a much large dosage per shot than
181
Claire Felter, A Guide to Global COVID–19 Vaccine Efforts, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN REL, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/guide-global-covid–19-vaccine
-efforts (last updated Mar. 1, 2021, 9:00 AM).
182
FDA Takes Key Action in Fight Against COVID–19 by Issuing Emergency
Authorization for First COVID–19 Vaccine, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Dec. 11,
2020), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-takes-key-act
ion-fight-against-covid-19-issuing-emergency-use-authorization-first-covid-19
183
Nathan Bartlett, Pfizer Vaccine may not be the Choice for Frail People,
but it’s too Early to make Firm Conclusions, THE CONVERSATION (Jan. 18, 2021,
1:43 AM), https://theconversation.com/the-pfizer-vaccine-may-not-be-the-bestchoice-for-frail-people-but-its-too-early-to-make-firm-conclusions-153445; see
also Understanding and Explaining mRNA COVID–19 Vaccines, CTR. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/covid-19
/hcp/mrna-vaccine-basics.html (last reviewed Nov. 24, 2020).
184
Bartlett, supra note 183.
185
Alejandra Martinez, Moderna vs. Pfizer: Is There a “Best” mRNA Vaccine?, THE SCIENTIST (Sept. 24, 2021), https://www.the-scientist.com/news-opin
ion/moderna-vs-pfizer-is-there-a-best-mrna-vaccine-69229.
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Helen Branswell, A Side–by–Side Comparison of the Pfizer/BioNTech and
Moderna Vaccines, STATNEWS, https://www.statnews.com/2020/12/19/a-sideby-side-comparison-of-the-pfizer-biontech-and-moderna-vaccines/ (last updated
Jan. 31, 2022).
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Pfizer. 189 The Pfizer vaccine is administered with a first shot of 30
micrograms of the vaccine and a second shot after 21 days of the
same dosage. 190 Moderna has a 100 microgram dosage and the second dose is administered after a 28–day waiting period. 191
Both Moderna and Pfizer–BioNTech claim that several of their
preexisting patents protect their vaccine formulations. 192 As listed
on Moderna’s website, they have seven patents that protect their
COVID–19 mRNA–1273 vaccine. 193 These patents are from the
U.S. and foreign jurisdictions. 194 Similarly, the Pfizer–BioNTech
COVID–19 vaccine has patent protections both nationally and internationally. 195
B.

U.S. Response to COVID–19
Similar to the U.S. response during the Ebola outbreak of 2014–
2016, the U.S. was quick to get involved in pharmaceutical research
for a virus that was and continues to impact people within their borders. 196 The U.S. took swift steps to promote a COVID–19 vaccine
development process after the initial outbreak. 197 Through several
strategic steps, the U.S. gave U.S.–based pharmaceutical corporations a leg up in creating the world’s first COVID–19 vaccines. 198
Branswell, supra note 186.
Id.
191
Id.
192
See Daniel Shores, Breaking Down Moderna’s COVID–19 Patent Pledge:
Why Did they do it?, IP WATCHDOG (Nov. 11, 2020), https://www.ipwatchdog.c
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Mario Gaviria & Burcu Kilic, BioNTech and Pfizer’s BNT162 Vaccine Patent
Landscape, PUB. CITIZEN (Nov. 16, 2020), https://www.citizen.org/article/bion
tech-and-pfizers-bnt162-vaccine-patent-landscape/.
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Program Patents, MODERNA, https://www.modernatx.com/patents (last
visited Jan. 20, 2021).
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Gaviria & Kilic, supra note 192.
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See generally Karen Weintraub & Elizabeth Weise, Federal Spending on
COVID–19 Vaccine Candidates Tops $9 Billion, Spread among 7 Companies,
USA TODAY (Aug. 8, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
health/2020/08/08/feds-spending-more-than-9-billion-covid-19-vaccine-candidates/5575206002/.
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David E. Sanger et al., Profits and Pride at Stake, the Race for a Vaccine
Intensifies, NY TIMES (May 2, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/02/us/p
olitics/vaccines-coronavirus-research.html.
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With respect to funds, the U.S. acted rapidly to ease the financial
burden on the companies that were engaging in COVID–19 R&D
for a potential vaccine. 199 The U.S. Patent and Trade Office
(USPTO) enacted a process called the “COVID–19 Prioritized Examination Pilot Program” on May 8, 2020. 200 This program sought
to fast–track the development of COVID–19 related technology and
medication by expediting applications for patents relating to this research. 201 At the start of this program, the Patent Office began accepting requests for priority examination of up to 500 qualifying patent applications that pertained to COVID–19 ideas. 202 Furthermore,
the Office also waived the payment of certain fees that are usually
associated with prioritized examination of patent applications. 203
The U.S. also limited regulations that were required of new vaccines by allowing the use of vaccines that had not yet been approved
to help mitigate the Covid–19 pandemic. 204 Both the Pfizer and
Moderna vaccines were given emergency use authorization status,
which allowed the vaccines to be given to certain groups of people
while safety and effectiveness studies were still underway. 205 Any
new vaccine must be reviewed by the FDA, a process which involves a study conducted with thousands of people. 206 The normal
process can take up to a decade in some cases. 207 However, as the
Weintraub & Weise, supra note 196.
COVID–19 Prioritized Examination Pilot Program, U.S. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/initiatives/covid-19-prioritized-exami
nation-pilot (last visited Jan. 22, 2021).
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Department of Commerce Patent and Trademark Office; COVID–19 Prioritized Examination Pilot Program, 85 Fed. Reg. 94, 28932 (May 14, 2020).
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Emergency Use Authorization for Vaccines Explained, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. (Nov. 11, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/vaccines-blood-biologics/vac
cines/emergency-use-authorization-vaccines-explained [hereinafter EUA Explained].
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Berkeley Lovelace Jr., FDA Approves Second Covid Vaccine for Emergency use as it Clears Moderna’s for U.S. Distribution, CNBC (Dec. 18, 2020,
7:59 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/18/moderna-covid-vaccine-approvedfda-for-emergency-use.html; see generally EUA Explained, supra note 204.
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What does emergency use of a COVID–19 vaccine mean?, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Nov. 20, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/emergency-use-covid-19-vaccine-explained-c8cca451619c1705e06414a32c20facb.
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past years have come to show, the coronavirus is anything but normal. During the coronavirus pandemic, the FDA has minimally
loosened their standards to allow “emergency use of experimental
drugs, devices, vaccines, and other medical products.” 208 This emergency authorization process was beneficial to pharmaceutical companies who were attempting to be the first into market with their
COVID–19 vaccines. 209
When large pharmaceutical companies started to get close to a
potential vaccine, the U.S. government was quick to strike a deal
with these corporations. 210 During the early clinical phases of Pfizer
and BioNTech’s vaccine research, the U.S. made an agreement for
a future order of the vaccine on July 22, 2020. 211 The deal with
Pfizer stipulated that the U.S. government would order an initial 100
million doses of the vaccine for $1.95 billion. 212 This deal also included a provision that the U.S. could acquire an additional 500 million doses. 213 Similarly, the U.S. also made an agreement with
Moderna a month later in August of 2020. 214 The Moderna deal
stated that Moderna would supply the U.S. government with an initial 100 million doses of their vaccine for $1.525 billion. 215 The
Id.
See generally Claudia Assis, Pfizer, BioNTech make it Official: COVID–
19 Vaccine EUA Submitted, MARKET WATCH (Nov. 20, 2020, 5:25 PM), https://
www.marketwatch.com/story/pfizer-biontech-make-it-official-covid-19-vaccine-eua-submitted-2020-11-20.
210
See generally Will Feuer, U.S. Agrees to Pay Pfizer and BioNTech $2 Billion for 100 Million Doses of Coronavirus Vaccine, CNBC (July 22, 2020, 7:16
AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/22/us-government-taps-pfizer-to-producemillions-of-doses-of-coronavirus-vaccine.html.
211
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COV–2, PFIZER (July 22, 2020, 7:10 AM), https://www.pfizer.com/news/pressrelease/press-release-detail/pfizer-and-biontech-announce-agreement-us-government-600.
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Jeff Mason & Carl O’Donnell, U.S. Inks $1.5 Billion Deal with Moderna
for 100 Million Doses of COVID–19 Vaccine, REUTERS (Aug. 11, 2020, 6:08 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-moderna-vaccine/u-sinks-1-5-billion-deal-with-moderna-for-100-million-doses-of-covid-19-vaccineidUSKCN2572T5.
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Moderna deal also provided the U.S. government an option to purchase an additional 400 million doses. 216
C.

Canadian Response
Canada took a less straight–forward approach by relying on
“supply contracts to secure COVID–19 vaccines from drugmakers
like Pfizer.” 217 This course of action positioned Canada’s funding to
buy doses of the vaccine from abroad. 218 While still economically
affluent in many ways, Canada recognized that the process of developing and manufacturing a vaccine would take large pockets which
would be tough for them to substantiate. 219 As reported by Michael
Mullette, the new managing director of Moderna’s Canadian subsidiary, the U.S. has 10 times the population of that in Canada—a
factor in assessing “pandemic vaccine preparedness.” 220 Thus, in addition to Canada’s prior purchase agreements in 2020, the country
is still currently procuring more vaccine dosages via more purchase
agreements. 221
Notwithstanding their reliance on supply contracts, Canada has
seen “more experimental COVID–19 vaccines in development than
any country aside from the U.S. and China.” 222 Medicago, based in
Quebec, had been working with minor funding on a plant–based
vaccine that includes an efficacy booster, called adjuvant, from
GlaxoSmithKline. 223 Medicago is own by the tobacco company
Philip Morris and by Japan’s Mitsubishi Tanabe Pharma. 224 The
company produced promising data quite early and received a
m/article/us-health-coronavirus-moderna/u-s-govt-secures-access-to-100-million-more-doses-of-modernas-covid-19-vaccine-idUSKBN28L2SY.
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purchase offer from the Canadian government in October of
2020. 225 This deal included a Canadian $173 million purchase
agreement. 226 This amount was starkly less than the amount that the
U.S. provided to Moderna in their developmental stages. 227 However, Medicago was quite far behind the two power players, as they
were only expecting to produce “up to 100 million doses by the end
of 2021.” 228 Should Medicago’s development reach this scale, Canada would be the first to receive the Medicago vaccine. 229 As of
February 24, 2022, Medicago has received approval for their vaccine from Health Canada and seeks to fulfill the order in the purchase agreement as soon as possible. 230
V.
TRIPS EXCEPTIONS AND THE RIGHT TO HEALTH
Given the positive effect of IP protections and the right to health
on the overall welfare of individuals worldwide, 231 there is a need
for both rights to co–exist internationally. Although there are inconsistencies between the two rights at times, utilization of the full
scope and language of these international documents allows for a
complementary reading where the right to health melds with international IP protections. 232 In fact, with greater flexibility within the
international IP regime, these protections can improve individuals’
access to medications and other healthcare technologies. 233
225
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Diane Nicol & Olasupo Owoeye, Using TRIPS Flexibilities to Facilitate
Access to Medicines, BULL. OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Apr. 18, 2013), https:
//www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/91/7/12-115865/en/.
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A.
Exceptions to International IP Rights that Account for the
Right to Health
Recognizing the impact that stringent IP protections can have on
individuals’ access to health, the WTO provided flexibility within
the TRIPS Agreement and implemented the DOHA Declaration so
that members had the power to impose restrictions on international
trade laws in order to protect individuals’ health. 234 Explicitly recognized is the right to utilize this flexibility in times of national
emergencies, such as those presented during a global pandemic. 235
DOHA simply clarifies the authorization of states to utilize the flexibilities present within the TRIPS Agreement that are enumerated in
case of a national emergency. 236 The agreement reiterates the types
of actions that states can take regarding patents during a national
emergency. 237
There are two prominent sections of the TRIPS Agreement
which limit IP protections. Article 27(2) of the TRIPS Agreement
specifically excludes from patentability any invention when exclusion is “necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to
protect human, animal, or plant life or health.” 238 This language outlines a relationship between pharmaceutical patents and health
within the international trade framework. The next is Article 31(b),
which identifies a national emergency exception. 239 Article 31(b)
proposes that a member does not need to get prior authorization from
the right holder “on reasonable commercial terms and conditions”
in order to use a patent in a case of a national emergency. 240 Should
a national emergency arise, the right holder must only be “notified
as soon as reasonably practicable.” 241 Although seemingly applicable during the COVID–19 pandemic, a national emergency is not

234
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237
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defined within the TRIPS Agreement, so the interpretation of which
events constitute this high standard are left to each member state. 242
B.
Current Problems Surrounding the Listed Exclusions and
Provisions
A current problem with the exceptions provided for within the
TRIPS Agreement and DOHA is the vagueness of the written
terms. 243 Both the TRIPS Agreement and DOHA fail to define
clearly what constitutes a national emergency. 244 With such ambiguity, it is often left to the state to determine whether a public health
outbreak constitutes a “national emergency,” and would therefore
trigger application of the exclusions. 245 This difference in interpretations can lead to a lack of standardized application of the exceptions when a public health issue does arise. 246 Furthermore, both
agreements fail to define what constitutes an epidemic. 247 As detailed above, this ambiguity leaves decision–making of what constitutes an epidemic to each country, which leaves less developed
countries in a problematic place because if they were to invoke this
exclusion they may face repercussions from their trade partners in
other areas. 248
C.
Provisions within the TRIPS Agreement to Promote the
Right to Health during a Health Crisis
i. Compulsory Licenses
Compulsory licenses are permitted within the “other use without
authorization of the right holder” section of the TRIPS Agreement
to balance the promotion of R&D into new drugs and “promoting
access to existing drugs.” 249 Compulsory licensing is the process of
governments allowing another person to “produce the patented
242
Dawn Dziuba, TRIPS Article 31BIS and H1N1 Swine Flu: Any Emergency
or Urgency Exception to Patent Protection?, 20 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 195,
196 (2010).
243
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244
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product or process without the consent of the patent owner.” 250 This
process can be especially beneficial to under–developed countries,
as they have the ability to ensure that the good is available to the
individuals in their territory for an affordable price. 251 Furthermore,
promoting compulsory licensing can help prevent advanced countries from advancing a theory of neocolonialism by upholding strict
patent protections which disproportionally “favor advanced countries as developing countries have much fewer patents to protect.” 252
Overall, the largest benefit of compulsory licensing is the ability of
this process to save the lives of those in lower–developed countries
by ensuring the accessibility of generic drugs at an affordable
price. 253
In order to enact a compulsory licensing process, several requirements must be met beforehand. 254 These requirements are put
in place with the intent to protect the legitimate interests of the original patent holder. 255 Typically, absent a national emergency, the individual seeking to license the drug must first attempt “to obtain a
voluntary license from the right holder on reasonable commercial
terms.” 256 If the license is granted, then the licensee must provide
“adequate remuneration” to the original patent holder. 257 While a
national or other extreme urgency may provide a bypass for the initial requirement, there are still lingering requirements present. 258 For
example, compulsory licenses may not be granted exclusively to licensees. 259 An issued license must also be limited in “scope and duration” for the “purpose for which it was granted.” 260 Finally, an
Justin Culbertson & Jason J. Jardine, Compulsory Patent Licensing in the
Era of Pandemic, INT’L BAR ASS’N. (June 30, 2020), https://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=36a60309-5a33-4891-8624-86a6d89a251e.
251
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issuance of a compulsory license does not diminish the right of the
original patent holder. 261 The patent holder is still entitled to compensation for any duplicates of the product that is made under the
compulsory license. 262
ii. Parallel Importation
Parallel importation, along with compulsory licensing, is another method of providing access to a patented good within the
TRIPS Agreement that has been described by the WTO in their application of DOHA. 263 Simply put, parallel importation describes
the process of a patented good being imported into another country
with or without the patent–holder’s consent. 264 Therefore, the original patent holder or exclusive licensee of the right in either territory
may not be the same. 265 The notion behind this idea is that the patent
holder is not able to prohibit subsequent resales of patented goods
because the patent holder’s control over those goods is “exhausted”
after the good has been placed on the market initially by the
holder. 266
The idea of permitting parallel transportation is highlighted in
Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement and the DOHA Declaration. 267
Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement states that “practices relating to
parallel importation cannot be challenged under the WTO dispute
settlement system.” 268 Moreover, DOHA affirms this right by
providing that member states have the right to establish their “own
regime for such exhaustion without challenge.” 269
The prices of patented goods sold under the practice of parallel
importation can be explained by the discrepancies in the goods
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market. 270 The rationale behind parallel importation is to allow for
the importation of lower priced, patented products into less developed countries. 271 In an application of parallel importation, a less
developed country has the ability to import and resell a genuine
product from a distributor who has legally obtained the product from
a manufacturer at a low price instead of the country buying the product directly from the manufacturer. 272 Thus, the product enters a
country’s market with the express approval of the IP holder. However, the product is then exported to another country without consent. 273
There is one significant benefit and one significant detriment to
the practice of parallel importation that should be noted. First, parallel importation can be a great tool in promoting access to affordable drugs worldwide. 274 Since there are substantial differences in the
price between the same drug sold in different markets, parallel importation allows for countries to account for their specific markets. 275 The main consequence of this approach for those in developing countries is the cost of transportation that is associated with
importing and packaging medicine. 276 These costs can “decrease a
significant portion of any potential price advantages.” 277
Clarification of the U.S.’s treatment of parallel importation is the
Supreme Court’s decision in Impression Products, Inc., v. Lexmark
Int’l, Inc.. 278 The Court held that a patent holder was not able to
bring an infringement suit against a remanufacturer. 279 Here, a toner
company, Lexmark, “sells toner cartridges to consumers in the
United States and around the Globe” with a cartridge that is
DOHA Declaration Explained, supra note 84.
Id.
272
SPA Ajibade & Co., Parallel Importation and the Exhaustion of Rights
Principle under the “TRIPS Agreement” and the “Doha Declaration”,
LEXOLOGY (Dec. 11, 2015), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=30
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PHARM. RSCH. 1111, 1113 (2014).
275
Id.
276
Id.
277
Id.
278
Impression Products, Inc., v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017).
279
Id. at 1536.
270
271

2022]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

179

protected by several patents. 280 In order to keep business for used
toner cartridges, the company attempted to provide customers with
an incentive to only use the cartridge once instead of having it refilled by another person or company. 281 However, other companies,
like Impression Products, would buy the used cartridges, fill them
with toner, and resell them. 282 After being sued by Lexmark, the Supreme Court held that Lexmark had “exhausted its patent rights in
these cartridges the moment it sold them.” 283 While the Court explored Lexmark’s potential claim under contract law, it ultimately
noted that Lexmark had no authority to retain “patent rights in an
item that it has elected to sell.” 284 The rationale behind this holding
was the principle that the “exhaustion rule marks the point where
patent rights yield to the common law principle against restraints on
alienation.” 285 As applied to a vaccine, this case would permit a distributor to purchase vaccines in bulk and then later sell these vaccines to other countries at a discounted rate.
iii. Least Developed Countries (LDC) Provision
At the forefront of the discussion on access and availability of a
COVID–19 vaccine for less developed countries is the LDC Transition Period set forth in the TRIPS Agreement. 286 Due to the special
requirements of LDC, such as their “economic, financial and administrative techniques,” LDCs have an “extended transition period to
protect IP under the WTO’s” TRIPS Agreement. 287 In the preamble
of the TRIPS Agreement, this need is recognized and is set forth to
prove a high rate of flexibility for LDCs in implementing “laws and
Id. at 1529.
Id. at 1530.
282
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283
Id. at 1531.
284
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285
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The Need to Extend the WTO TRIPS Pharmaceuticals Transition Period
for LDCs in the COVID–19 Era: Evidence from Bangladesh, UNITED NATIONS
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regulations domestically.” 288 In Article 66.1 of the agreement, this
transition period has been extended on two occasions. 289 The transition period for pharmaceutical patents was initially extended until
July 1, 2021. 290 Provoked by the pandemic, another proposal has
been entered so as to permit another extension for LDCs as they may
face difficulties when attempting to manufacture vaccines in their
own countries. 291
D.
Utilizing the Safeguard Provisions of the TRIPS Agreement
to Promote the Right to Health for COVID–19 Vaccines
On October 2, 2020, both India and South Africa petitioned the
WTO to “allow all WTO members to bypass granting or enforcement of patents . . . on COVID–19–related drugs, vaccines, diagnostics and other medical technologies for the duration of the pandemic” under the TRIPS Agreement provisions. 292 Highlighting the
devastating health effects of a global pandemic, the petitioning
countries sought to waive enforcements for any COVID–19 treatments for the duration of the pandemic. 293 The strongest legal
ground for this proposal was the national health crisis section of the
TRIPS Agreement. On October 15, 2020, 40 member states of the
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 78, at pmbl.
Nirmalya Syam, The Trips Council on 15–16 October Should Agree to Extend the Transition Period That Exempts Least Developed Countries From Implementation of the WTO Trips Agreement, INFOJUSTICE (Oct. 7, 2020), http://infojustice.org/archives/42666.
290
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WTO discussed this proposal and most of the developing countries
supported the proposal. 294 Powerful countries, like the U.S., Japan,
and Canada, continue to block this proposal despite a global pandemic seeming to be well within this exception. 295 There has still
been no action taken on this petition. 296 The WTO upholding coronavirus as a national health crisis would promote acceptance of this
proposal, which would uphold the core standards of the TRIPS
Agreement while ensuring that individuals residing in less developed countries have the opportunity to receive the vaccine in a reasonable amount of time. 297
Moderna has already pledged to engage in any licensing deals to
help combat the COVID–19 virus, which negates the need for a
compulsory license under the TRIPS Agreement because they are
voluntarily permitting other countries, upon request, to license their
COVID–19 vaccine. 298 This pledge to permit licensing upon request
creates an opportunity for lesser developed countries to access the
vaccine in a more expedient manner than if their vaccine stockage
was dependent upon their ability to afford the vaccine prices set
forth by the actual patent holder corporation. 299 Additionally, these
licensing deals would “allow other market participants to aggressively pursue mRNA–based therapies for COVID–19 without fear
of suit.” 300 While the motives for such a pledge may lie in
Moderna’s goal of building an infrastructure for technology based
on mRNA, it nonetheless creates an opportunity for countries to
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prioritize the right to health within their borders while Moderna retains their IP protections. 301
A forced compulsory license process could be extremely beneficial in leveraging the vaccine formulation created by Pfizer and
BioNTech, as the corporations have failed to give any indication that
they will renounce their exclusive right to produce their vaccine. 302
In this situation, countries which have failed to receive authorization
to license the Pfizer–BioNTech coronavirus vaccine would receive
permission to license the vaccine formulation without consent from
the patent holding companies. 303 When granting patents to corporations that are producing COVID–19 vaccines, countries have the authority to put restrictions on exclusive patent rights, which would
help balance the health of the public and the creators’ rights over
their own creations. 304 The U.S., for example, has implemented
“march in” rights under the Bayh–Dole Act, which would permit the
U.S. government to “compel the owner of any invention obtained
through federal funding to license it to one or more third parties to
the extent necessary, among other things, to address health or safety
needs, ‘upon terms that are reasonable under the circumstances.’” 305
As long as the government adequately compensates the original IP
holders, taking this course of action could significantly benefit those
who are unable to attain a licensing deal from the pharmaceutical
company themselves. 306
Utilizing the parallel imports option may prove to be a challenging feat that would not be plausible with the COVID–19 vaccines. 307
Parallel importation is a complex process and even more so with a
vaccine that is being provided to countries on a limited quantity
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basis. 308 Countries that are hoping to import the vaccine would
“need to negotiate formal contracts with an exporting country’s producer” which can be difficult even without the costly devastation
imposed by a pandemic. 309 Furthermore, these imports would be required to have their own packaging designs, and approval to import
is “only for a specific time and for a specific purpose.” 310 All of
these restrictions may be impossible to work around for the vaccine.
Countries like the U.S. and Canada should not continue to halt
the LDC extension proposal, so that LDCs are not required to enforce global trade rules that protect pharmaceutical patents during a
global pandemic. 311 The pandemic has created a need to reexamine
the coexistent nature of trade and health and ensure that any IP laws
are in accordance with the international right to health provisions. 312
Research indicates that is it necessary for LDCs to take maximum
advantage of the TRIPS extension for LDCs as the COVID–19 virus
creates a need for “mass production of low–cost treatments” and
vaccines. 313 Permitting an extension of Article 66.1 would allow for
LDCs to engage in this imperative task during a national health crisis. Recognizing that the “economic devastation and human cost of
the pandemic will require full international support” is a stepping
stone in realizing the impact that economically developed countries
actions will have on the availability and accessibility of a COVID–
19 vaccine in LDCs. 314 While a set date to end the TRIPS extension
period may be required eventually, there should nonetheless be an
emergency extension set forth that would accommodate for the unnatural circumstances that have been caused by the coronavirus pandemic.
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VI.
CONCLUSION
While compulsory licenses and extensions are viable options to
promote widespread distribution of the vaccine, the seemingly more
effective way to do so is through the acceptance of the proposed
“temporary waiver suspending TRIPs obligation on all medical
products needed to control the COVID–19 pandemic.” 315 The actions of the U.S. and Canada in attempting to block the proposal
starkly contrast with the international human rights obligations in
place. 316 Promotion of this waiver during a time of crisis would allow for LDCs to help combat the spread of coronavirus by attaining
herd immunity with a COVID–19 vaccine. 317 The current TRIPS
Agreement flexibilities are insufficient to combat this national
health emergency and their implementation would “slows down the
ability of countries to scale up production of needed COVID–19
products.” 318 Imposition of an obligation, not a voluntary act like
that of Moderna, is a necessary step validated under the TRIPS
Agreement and would help contain a virus that has already caused
so much devastation.
The purpose of this article is not to suggest that patent protections should be rolled back completely during the coronavirus pandemic, but to suggest that there are means of loosening a certain
amount of patent protections without disparaging the rights of millions of people across the globe. There can be some coexistence
where the rights of public health and the private rights of IP holders
can be balanced so as to promote a society where medical inventions
can continue to thrive while the entire population accesses these inventions. While the imposition of compulsory licensing deals upon
companies like Pfizer may not be looked well upon by the company,
it would create an opportunity for millions of people to access vaccines that have been created to combat a worldwide pandemic.
Looking at IP rights within a greater human rights framework will
highlight the balanced trade–off between IP rights and the limitation
of these rights in the process of promoting the right to health. While
Labonte & Johri, supra note 307.
Id.
317
Id.; see also Members Discuss Intellectual Property Response to the
COVID–19 Pandemic, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Oct. 20, 2020), https://www.wto.or
g/english/news_e/news20_e/trip_20oct20_e.htm.
318
Labonte & Johri, supra note 307.
315
316

2022]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

185

there is no perfect system that would please every actor, decisions
made internationally during a global pandemic should not be made
lightly. Promotion of herd immunity will alleviate global economic
strain and human loss—a result that can be obtained via the exclusion provisions already set forth within the TRIPS Agreement.

